Abstract:
Software side-channel vulnerabilities (SSCVs) allow an attacker to gather secrets by observing the differential in the time or space required for executing the program for different inputs. Detecting SSCVs is like searching for a needle in the haystack, not knowing what the needle looks like. Detecting SSCVs requires automation that supports systematic exploration to identify vulnerable code, formulation of plausible side-channel hypotheses, and gathering evidence to prove or refute each hypothesis. This paper describes human-on-the-loop automation to empower analysts to detect SSCVs. The proposed automation is founded on novel ideas for canonical side channel patterns, program artifact filters, and parameterized program graph models for efficient, accurate, and interactive program analyses. The detection process is exemplified through a case study. The paper also presents metrics that bring out the complexity of detecting SSCVs.
Venue: The 13th International Conference on Information System Security (ICISS 2017), Mumbai, India, December, 2017.
Authors: Ganesh Ram Santhanam, Benjamin Holland, Suresh Kothari, Nikhil Ranade